BIPPI - Dispute over Western Sahara

BIPPI

B's Independent Pro-Peace Initiative

Dispute for control of Western Sahara – 1975/1991 (to present day)
updated at February 2008

Source © Wikipedia

Source © DigiAtlas

NOTE: Translated from Arab, names can be written in many ways, according to English, French or Spanish pronunciation. It is not always clear which the current English version of them is.
Both words Sahrawi and Saharawi (Saharaoui) are internationally used. We use here only the Sahara/Saharawi form.
Western Sahara (Sahara Occidental in Spanish) is a territory of north-western Africa, bordered by Morocco to the north, Algeria in the northeast, Mauritania to the east and south, and the Atlantic Ocean on the west. It is one of the most sparsely populated territories in the world, mainly consisting of desert flatlands. The largest city is Laâyoune (El Aaiún), which is home to over half of the population of the territory.
Western Sahara is mostly administrated by Morocco as its Southern Provinces. The Polisario Front claims to control the area behind the border Moroccan wall (the red line in the map) as the Free Zone on behalf of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. The Polisario has its home base in the Tindouf refugee camps in Algeria.
For administrative and political purposes Morocco has divided Western Sahara into four provinces which have ten seats, filled by Saharawis whose political views are favourable to the regime, in the Moroccan Parliament. The provinces of Laâyoune, Smara, and Boujdour have taken part in elections since 1977 and Oued Ed Dahab province since 1983.
Read more on Western Sahara.
The Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front independence movement (and government of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic or SADR) dispute control of the territory. Since a United Nations-sponsored cease-fire agreement in 1991, most of the territory has been controlled by Morocco, with the remainder under the control of Polisario/SADR. Internationally, the major powers such as the United States have taken a generally ambiguous and neutral position on each side's claims, and have pressed both parties to agree on a peaceful resolution. Both Morocco and Polisario have sought to boost their claims by accumulating formal recognition, from largely minor states. Polisario has won formal recognition for SADR from roughly 45 states, and was extended membership in the African Union, while Morocco has won formal recognition for its position from 25 states, as well as the membership of the Arab League. In both instances, recognitions have over the past two decades been extended and withdrawn according to changing international trends.

Western Sahara has been on the United Nations list of Non-Self-Governing Territories since the 1960s when it was a Spanish colony. It is considered today the last case of incomplete decolonization.

ECHO dossier on Western Sahara.

TYPE OF CONFLICT
Dispute for state control after Spanish colonisation.

FIGHTING FACTIONS
From 1884 to 1975 Western Sahara was a Spanish colony.
In 1975, following the Spanish withdrawal, Morocco occupied the north of the territory and Mauritania the south of it.
In 1979, following Mauritania's withdrawal, Morocco extended its control to the rest of the territory facing Polisario's guerrilla.
In 1991, hostilities ceased in a cease-fire.

The dispute is today between:
1) Moroccan government which has historical claims of sovereignty over the territory;
2) The Polisario, Polisario Front, or Frente Polisario, from the Spanish abbreviation of Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro ("Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro"), a Saharawi rebel movement working for the indipendence of Western Sahara.

<Saharawi is the most commonly used term for the natives of the Morocco-occupied Western Sahara. Ethnic Saharawis are however found in southern Morocco and northern Mauritania as well, the Western Sahara conflict having fractured this tiny nomad people into several communities forced to exist under wildly differing cultural and political conditions. The exact size of the Saharawi ethnic group is unknown, and due to the political dispute it is hard to find neutral accounts, but it is probably somewhere over 500.000. Of which 200-250.000 are original inhabitants of Western Sahara.
In Arabic, the word "Saharawi" means "of the Sahara", the word Sahara itself meaning desert. Thus, the literal meaning is "desert inhabitant". They are today of mixed Arab-Berber descend. They speak the Arabic dialect of Hassaniya, notoriously difficult to understand for non-Saharawi Arab speakers, and they also see Spanish as part of their cultural legacy, Spain having colonized Western Sahara whereas the rest of North Africa was under French rule. Religiously, they are sunni muslims of the malikiya school. Their way of life has always been nomadic and tribal, and they have developed a Bedouin culture distinct from the settled Arabs in Mauritania, Algeria and Morocco.> (sources from Wikipedia)

<Moroccans are Sunni Muslims of Arab, Berber, or mixed Arab-Berber stock. The Arabs invaded Morocco in the 7th and 11th centuries and established their culture there. Morocco's Jewish minority has decreased significantly and numbers about 7.000. Most of the 100.000 foreign residents are French or Spanish; many are teachers or technicians.
Arabic is Morocco's official language (it is the "classical" Arabic of the Qur'an, literature and news media). The country's distinctive Arabic dialect is the most widely spoken language in Morocco. Approximately 10 million Moroccans, mostly in rural areas, speak Berber either as a first language or bilingually with the spoken Arabic dialect. French, which remains Morocco's unofficial third language, is taught universally and still serves as Morocco's primary language of commerce and economics; it also is widely used in education and government. About 20.000 Moroccans in the northern part of the country speak Spanish.> (sources from Wikipedia)

CASUALTIES
According to independent sources, an estimated 7,000 Moroccans and 4,000 Saharawis have died from 1975 to 1991 and an estimated 125,000 to 175,000 people live displaced in the refugee camps in Tindouf.

WEAPONS' SUPPLIERS
Morocco's government was basically supported by USA (Polisario was believed to have communist leanings), Great Britain and France.
Spain started to sell weapons to Morocco in 1984. Israel sent military advisers in 1985.
Today Moroccan troops in Western Sahara estimate from 100,000 to 150,000.

Polisario received support by Algeria and Libya (till 1984). Its troops are estimated 2,000 to 12,000 in the so-called Free Zone, but they were much more in the past years.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The social structure of the nomadic communities of the desert is marked by constant migrations. Then, it is difficult to define national borders within the territory of north-west Africa if not using the boundary lines drawn by the colonisers. So the official borders are with Algeria (42 km), Mauritania (1.561 km) and Morocco (443 km. The length of the coastline is 1.100 km. The sandy Atlantic coast in west, the Quarkziz and Oued Draa mountain chain in north and the barren desert in east and south form natural boundaries to the region, which has always been thinly populated by mainly nomadic people.

Over the centuries there have been historical links between Morocco and Western Sahara. These connections were not in the modern sense of a state or political rather more through religious, cultural and personal contacts. The presence of the trans-Saharan trade routes meant that the region was a place where different cultures and peoples met as they passed through, each leaving their mark. Then, as the history of the Saharawis and Moroccans is strongly mixed with that of all the neighbouring countries, what really makes today a "people" out of them, like for other African and no-African countries, is not the reference to borders of the pre-colonial past but the will of people who identify themselves in the same social, religious and linguistic print.

The earliest recorded inhabitants of the Western Sahara in historical times were agriculturalists called Bafour. The Bafour were later replaced or absorbed by Berber-language speaking populations which eventually merged in turn with migrating Arab tribes, although the Arabic speaking majority in the Western Sahara clearly by the historical record descend from Berber tribes that adopted Arabic over time. There may also have been some Phoenician contacts in antiquity, but such contacts left few if any long-term traces.

The arrival of Islam in the 8th century played a major role in the development of relationships between the Saharan regions that later became the modern territories of Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania and Algeria, and neighbouring regions. Trade developed further and the region became a passage of caravans especially between Marrakech and Tombouctou in Mali. In the Middle Ages, the Almohad and Almoravid dynasties both originated from the Saharan regions and were able to control the area.

After the fall of the Almoravid empire in 1147 the new Moroccan empires (Almohad, Merinid and Wattasid) retained sovereignty over the western part of the Sahara but the effectiveness of it depended largely on the sultan that ruled.

Towards the late Middle Ages, the Beni Hassan Arab bedouin tribes invaded the Maghreb, reaching the northern border-area of the Sahara in the 14th and 15th century. Over roughly five centuries, through a complex process of acculturation and mixing seen elsewhere in the Maghreb and North Africa, the indigenous Berber tribes adopted Hassaniya Arabic and a mixed Arab-Berber nomadic culture.

With the coming to power of the Saadi Dynasty the sovereignty of Morocco over the western part of the Sahara became formally complete again: the Portuguese colonisers were expelled from Cape Bojador and from Cap Blanc and the borders of Morocco were moved up to the Senegal River in the south-west and to the Niger River in the south-east (see: Battle of Tondibi in 1591). The situation did not change with the coming of the (present) Alaouite Dynasty in 1659.

In the second half of the 19th century several European powers tried to get a foothold in Africa. France occupied Tunisia and Great Britain Ottoman Egypt. Italy took possession of parts of Eritrea, Belgium invaded Congo while Germany declared Togo, Cameroon and South West Africa to be under its protection. It was the so-called Scramble for Africa, the very start of a new wave of colonialism.

After the agreement among the European colonial powers at the Berlin Conference (1884 - 1885) on the division of spheres of influence in Africa, Spain seized control of the Western Sahara and declared it to be a Spanish protectorate in a series of wars against the local tribes.
Spanish colonial rule began to unravel with the general wave of decolonization after World War II, which saw Europeans lose control of North African and sub-Saharan Africa possessions and protectorates. Spanish decolonization in particular began rather late, as internal political and social pressures for it in mainland Spain built up towards the end of Francisco Franco's rule, and in combination with the global trend towards complete decolonization.

The UN's involvement in the Western Sahara issue started on December 16, 1965, when the General Assembly adopted its first resolution on what was then called Spanish Sahara, requesting Spain to "take all necessary measures" to decolonize the territory, while entering into negotiations on "problems relating to sovereignty".
Even the OAU Council of Ministers had adopted its first resolution on Western Sahara, at its 1st summit in Cairo, July 1966, asking the Member States "to respect the existing borders at the time when they reached independence".

Between 1966 and 1973 the UN General Assembly adopted seven more resolutions on the territory, all of which reiterated the need to hold a referendum on self-determination. Thus, the UN stated in unambiguous terms from the start that the Western Sahara conflict could be resolved only through an act of self-determination, in keeping with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. This position has been maintained by the organization up to the present day.
At the same time, Morocco and Mauritania, which had historical claims of sovereignty over the territory based on competing traditional claims, argued that the territory was artificially separated from their territories by the European colonial powers. The third neighbour of Spanish Sahara, Algeria, viewed these demands with suspicion, influenced also by its long-running rivalry with Morocco.

In the meanwhile a re-organization of the Saharawi indipendentist forces brought to the foundation of "Harakat Tahrir Saguia El Hamra wa Uad Ed-Dahab" or simply "Movement for the Liberation of the Sahara" (MLS), whose first actions did not have military character and took the shape of civil resistance.

In June 17, 1970, the colonial government called for a Saharawi manifestation in Laâyoune in order to express the adhesion to the Mother Native land (Spain).
The MLS took advantage of the occasion to mobilize the Saharawis on behalf of their independence. This led to a large, peaceful manifestation openly against Spanish colonialism. But the intervention in Zemla of the police and later of the Spanish Foreign Legion caused incidents at the end of which some eleven Saharawis were killed. After the so-called Zemla intifada, hundreds were arrested, some deported and others fled the country, marking the death of MLS.
Until this moment, except the "heroic" period of resistance to Europeans, the Saharawis were instruments in the hands of the colonial powers or of brother countries. But the news of Zemla's incidents created a lot more awareness among the Saharawis and in the international community concerning the fight for freedom.

UN resolutions passed in 1972 (n. 2983) and 1973 (n. 3162), affirming the right of Saharawis to self determination and independence.
Spain didn't deny that right but it also didn't take any positive steps towards it.
Morocco, like Spain, didn't contest the right of self-determination, but argued that the Saharawis had already exercised their right and opted to be an integral part of the kingdom.

On May 10, 1973, the Constitutive Congress for the Frente Polisario, was held. The Polisario (Frente POpular para la LIberacion de SAguia el Hamra y RIO de Oro) was born as a political movement, coming from the meeting of survivors of the MLS with a group of Saharawi students in Morocco.
Polisario created an armed division known as the Saharawi Popular Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Popular Sahraoui - ELPS), which began to fight against the occupants following a guerrilla warfare.

By 1974, the Spanish regime was in serious difficulties at home and feared the consequences of a military confrontation with Morocco, while the General Franco was old of 82 years and near to death. The Spanish population was not laid out to accept a war, and if a conflict burst, Spain would have been exposed to the diplomatic and economic reprisals of the Arab world.
So, on August 20, 1974, Spain announced a referendum on self-determination and took a census of the region in order to assess the voting population.
But King Hassan II ousted the idea of a referendum including the option of independence and, on September 17, 1974, announced his intention to bring the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In December the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution 3292 (XXIX) requesting "the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion at an early date on the following questions:

"I. Was Western Sahara (Saguia El-Hamra y Rio de Oro) at the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?"

"II. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?"

On January 16, 1975, Spain officially announced the suspension of the referendum plan, pending the opinion of the court. 65% of Bou-Craa exploitation was sold to Morocco.

In May-June an important mission of enquiry was sent by the UN secretary-general to Western Sahara, Spain, Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria. After many days of travelling the members of the mission could affirm in an unambiguous way that "there was an overwhelming consensus among Saharans within the Territory in favour of independence and opposing integration with any neighbouring country...."

On October 16, 1975 the IJC emitted its clear advisory opinion: on one side the Western Sahara was not a 'no man's land' before the Spanish occupation, there was evidence of a tie of allegiance between some, though not all, of the tribal chiefs and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity. "Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory."

Hours later the delivering of the advisory opinion, King Hassan II claimed the opposite. The IJC, he told his subjects, had vindicated his irredentism. Then he announced the Green March, and, on November 5, 1975, he ordered 350.000 unarmed Moroccans, Koran in hand, protected by the army, to march into the north of Western Sahara to reassert the sovereignty of the Territory. On November 6, the UN Security Council "deplored" this action and ordered Hassan to withdraw the marchers.

On November 14, 1975, Spain, Morocco and Mauritania signed the tripartite Madrid Agreement by which Morocco acquired the northern two-thirds of the territory, while Mauritania acquired the southern third.
Moroccan troops occupied Smara and other centres in the north, then they arrived in Laâyoune; Mauritanian army also attacked from the south, helped by Moroccan and French military advisers.
Polisario attacked the conveyor belt from Bou-Craa, forcing a halt to phosphate mining for several years.

Tens of thousands of people fled to Algeria, in the region of Tindouf, to escape the violence of the fighting. On February 18, 1976, the columns of refugees were victims of bombardments with napalm, phosphorus and cluster bombs by Moroccan aviation. Many were reported dead near Guelta Zemmour and Bir Lahlou.

Spain officially ended its administration in Western Sahara on February 26, 1976, as the UN received communication of the end of the Spanish presence in the territory and Spain's last soldier departed the territory. Spanish Foreign Minister, Areilza, affirmed that Spain did not transfer to Morocco and Mauritania the sovereignty over the territory but only transferred its administration.
From this moment on, according to the United Nations, Western Sahara will form part of the non-autonomous territories. The Special UN Envoy sent in February could only verify the impossibility of a free consultation among the population.

On February 27, 1976, the Polisario proclaimed the independence of Western Sahara and the birth of the Saharawi Arabic Democratic Republic or SADR.
(http://www.arso.org/photo27.htm).
The SADR was soon recognized by several dozens of countries, among which Algeria.
During the time the international recognition of SADR changed together with the global political alliances and it can be difficult to list precisely the countries which formally recognise the new republic.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_the_Sahrawi_Arab_Democratic_Republic)

In spite of this, Morocco and Mauritania officially divided Western Sahara on April 14, by a bilateral act not recognized by the international community.

In May, being completed the evacuation of the refugees, the Polisario began offensive military actions.
The war opposed at first Polisario's 2.000 dedicated desert guerrillas against 20.000 young Moroccan conscripts and Mauritanian forces. Despite the obvious advantages of Moroccan air power and army in the open desert, the Saharawis proved to be a hard customer for the enemies. Their main advantages were their knowledge of the territory; their use of physical and climactic characteristics (e.g. sirocco sandstorms) to impede the use of technological advantage; and their use of rapid hit-and-run style tactics, choosing the location and timing of attack. Isolated garrisons became vulnerable, being easily cut off and overwhelmed by Polisario forces.
The war spread beyond Western Sahara's borders into southern Morocco and, above all, Mauritania, by far the weaker of the two occupants.
In June a column of Polisario guerrillas crossed 1,500 km of desert and shelled Nouakchott, the Mauritanian capital.

In February 1977 Spain and Morocco signed a fishing agreement; consequently Polisario began attacking on Spanish fishing vessels.
In May Polisario attacked and held for over two hours in Zouerate, a small Northern town in Mauritania where a very important iron ore mine produced 1/6 of the country's GNP. Two French citizens were killed and six others were taken captive. French were forced to evacuate and mining came to a halt.

Polisario guerrillas severely weakened Mauritania by repeatedly cutting the Zouerate-Nouadhibou railway line that was the main route for the export of iron ore, on which Mauritania depended for 80-90% of its export earnings. Impoverished Mauritania couldn't afford the costs of the war.
As a consequence Mauritania signed a mutual defence pact with Morocco.

In July Nouakchott was attacked again by the Frente Polisario, and President Daddah was forced to appoint a military officer to head the ministry of defence. 9.000 Moroccan troops were airlifted into Zouerate to reinforce Mauritanians, so that the Mauritanian military (15.000 to 17.000 troops) resented its role as a back-up force to the Moroccans.

In October 1977, after two more French citizens were seized during a raid on the railway, French President Giscard d'Estaing ordered the military action called Opération Lamantin.
On December 12, French aircraft used napalm on Polisario units and their Mauritanian prisoners after attacking on the railway. Again, six days after, Jaguar aircraft bombed a Polisario column after attacking on the railway, killing 74 of 82 Mauritanian prisoners. So Polisario released French prisoners to UN.
In the meanwhile Spain announced an end to arms shipments to Morocco and Mauritania.

On July 10, 1978, in Mauritania, President Ould Daddah was deposed in a coup led by army officers who pledge to restore peace. Then, Polisario declared a cease-fire in Mauritanian territory and in one year the two belligerants signed the Algiers Agreement, by which Mauritania renounced its claim to Western Sahara and promised to withdraw completely within seven months. The Polisario, in return, renounced all claims regarding Mauritania.

In summer 1979, Polisario guerrillas overrun the Moroccan base of Lebouirate, where they took 111 prisoners and destroyed 37 tanks T-54. Polisario hold the town for over a year. They fought their way into Smara and captured another Moroccan base at Mahbes.
Thanks to the Algerian key-support, at the end of the 1970s the Polisario had under control the 90% of the Western Sahara. In these years many Soviet-aligned countries supported Polisario diplomatically and several, including Cuba, recognized the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic.

On Novembre 11, 1980, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution (A/RES/35/19) urging Morocco to "terminate the occupation of the Territory of Western Sahara".

At the beginning of the '80s, after Polisario's army (ELPS) defeated several times the Moroccan FAR, France sent military advisers to King Hassan II. Followed American advisers in 1982 and Israeli advisers in 1985.
the berm After Israeli advice and assisted by a billion dollar pay-out from the USA, between 1981-1987 Morocco built the so-called berm: a giant barrier over 1,600 km long, separating the Polisario-controlled east from the Moroccan-controlled west.
The berm (Saharawis call it “the wall of shame”) is made of earth, rock and sand and is in most places, three metres high. There are Moroccan garrisons (strong points with over 120.000 troops in all) regularly spaced every 5 Km along its length, protected by bunkers, trenches, barbed wire fences, landmines and electronic detection systems. Mobile reserves of Moroccan forces are located in garrisons behind the berm. The areas adjacent to the wall, particularly on the east side, are surrounded of electronic devices and lined on both sides by at least 200 metres of anti-personnel landmines.
Polisario attempted to disrupt the construction by some heavy fighting, but by May 1982 it was operative. Bou-Craa phosphate mine reopened from behind the safety of the wall and a heavy colonization started.

The construction of the berm resulted in what amounts to a military stalemate, so that military activity was scaled down in the mid-1980s. Polisario had control of a big chunk of the country, but anything of any importance (the fishing ports, the cities and the phosphate mines) is on the Moroccan side of the wall.

On February 22, 1982, the OAU admitted the SADR as the 51st full-fledged member. As a consequence, by time, 73 states recognised the SADR while Morocco left the Organisation.
The UN and the OAU worked together in these years to allow a self-determination referendum. Many resolutions were approved and they declared to be available to cooperate in the organisation of a fair referendum.

On August 11th, 1988, UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar proposed a cease-fire and the organisation of a referendum under international control, on the base of the 1974 Spanish census. On 30 August 1988, Morocco and Polisario accepted the UN-OUA baked peace plan and in November Polisario decreed a unilateral cease-fire. A UN resolution approved the peace process, but when Spain voted in favour of the resolution, for reaction King Hassan II cancelled its visit to the Iberian country and, at the same time, the rivendications on the official press on Ceuta and Melilla, the remaining plazas de soberanía ("places of sovereignty"), became stronger.

In March 1989, the European Parliament pronounced for the self-determination referendum and several times expressed concern about the violation of human rights in the occupied territories.

In 1990, the UN Security Council approved the resolution 658/90 containing the "Settlement Plan" for Western Sahara. By the resolution 690/91 the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established in accordance with the Settlement Plan.

MINURSO was created as an integrated group of United Nations civilian, military and civilian police personnel; up to total 1.000 civilian and 1.700 military personnel, it was mandated to:

Monitor the ceasefire;

Verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in the Territory;

Monitor the confinement of Moroccan and Frente POLISARIO troops to designated locations;

Take steps with the parties to ensure the release of all Western Saharan political prisoners or detainees;

Oversee the exchange of prisoners of war (International Committee of the Red Cross);

Implement the repatriation programme (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees);

Identify and register qualified voters;

Organize and ensure a free and fair referendum and proclaim the results

A long process of identification began, towards the referendum on the self-determination of the Saharawis which should be made in January 1992.
In August 1991, few days before the start of the UN negotiated cease-fire, Morocco triggered a great offensive. The zones of the Western Sahara under Polisario control were ravaged and many civilians were killed.
On September 6th, 1991, the cease-fire started and MINURSO began to occupy their positions.
Morocco controlled the areas west of the berm, the so-called Southern Provinces, including most of the territory's population and everything economically worth.
Polisario controlled the areas east of the berm, the so called Free Zone, mostly uninhabited desert.

THE DISPUTE FROM 1991 TO PRESENT DAY
The map below shows the situation in Western Sahara at the beginning of the cease-fire in September 1991.

Source © http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/suttonlink/334ws.pdf

In October/November 1991, in clear violation of the cease-fire norms, Morocco sent thousands of settlers to the occupied territory and attempted to block the referendum process by forcing the UN to accept them as voters. The technical materials of the UN were blocked in the Moroccan ports and the UN flag could not wave on Laâyoune, capital of the occupied Western Sahara.

In his report to the Security Council S/22464 of 19 December 1991, just before finishing his mandate, UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar accepted Moroccan positions, essentially asking for a revision of the electoral body opening the right to vote to pro-Morocco settlers.

The Secretary-General regretted that slow progress in the accomplishment of certain tasks had made it necessary to adjust the timetable of the settlement plan, largely due to the complexity of the identification process, aimed at establishing the list of those who would vote in the referendum, and the parties’ different interpretations of the plan in that regard." (UN repertoire)

The largest most permanent social unit was the Tribe that, in that part of the world, is also known as Kabil. The Tribes break down into Fractions and the latter into Sub-fractions. Fractions and Sub-fractions go back six to eight generations. The smallest meaningful social structure is the Ahel, or family unit, that gathers the last three to four generations. The Head of the Tribe or Tribal Fraction is the Sheik. Every tribe has its own laws and deliberative bodies (the Assembly of Notables or Djema'a). The tribes are the sole structures at which the claim of sovereignty could be laid.

Openly protesting against this new position, Secretary-General's Special Representative for the Western Sahara, the Swiss Johannes Manz, resigned. For the first time a Secretary-General report was not immediately accepted by the Security Council. Only at the end of the year the Security Council approved the new position of the Secretary-General and dismissed him; the new Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, was given mandate to present a new report before February 1992.

Before December 1991, the 3 accepted criteria to be registered as qualified voter for the referendum were:

being included in the 1974 Spanish census

being born to somebody inscribed in the 1974 census

owning a Spanish passport dating before the 1974 census.

In his 19 December 1991 report, just few days before the end of his mandate, Pérez de Cuéllar accepted 2 more criteria:

being born to somebody born in Western Sahara (it included many Saharawis living in Morocco)

having been living in Western Sahara since at least 6 years (it included all the Moroccans settled by the Green March)

*** A scandal occurred when, in February 1993, Pérez de Cuéllar became vice-director of the French Society OPTORG, belonging to the Moroccan Omnium Nord Africain (ONA), a large holding company whose President was Fouad Filali, the son of the Moroccan Prime Minister, Abdellatif Filali, and young husband of Lalla Meryem, King Hassan II's daughter.
(El Mundo, 27 May 1996, Tambores de tragedia en el Sahara)

Later, the new UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali introduced a further criterion: the oral recognition by a tribe chief (Sheik).
In this conditions some notables of the Polisario affirmed that the UN were working for the auto-determination of a people which was not the Saharawi.

In January 1992 the referendum was delayed "sine die" following disputes about who is eligible. The UN collapsed under the debts, MINURSO was impotent while Moroccan authorities repressed independentist demonstrations and moved new farmers to the occupied territories.

A mission of the US Senate in the Western Sahara, published on February 5th, affirmed: "The responsibilities of the serious delays of the peace plan are to be given to Morocco, to its wish not to collaborate and to the missed support of the UN Secretary-General to the MINURSO". Boutros-Ghali proposed a delay of at least three months to save the UN-baked plan. The Pakistani Sahabzade Yaqub Khan, generally considered pro-Morocco, was named as new Special Representative for the Western Sahara.

On May 29, 1992, in the report S/24040, Boutros-Ghali indicated the greatest obstacle for the realization of the referendum in the criteria of identification of the eligibles to the vote. In answer the UN Security Council invited the parts in conflict to "exceptional efforts to assure the success of the plan of peace."
The main issues related to the diplomatic efforts of the period 1991/92 can be read in the UN repertoire.

On September 4, 1992, in Morocco was held a referendum for the approval of the new Moroccan Constitution, extended to the Western Sahara, with which the King Hassan II kept on reserving himself interior, foreign and religious politics. Followed the Moroccan town elections, extended to the Sahara. The civil Saharawi population of the occupied territories started to manifest against the Moroccan presence. The intervention of the Moroccan special forces was hard and hundreds of Saharawis disappeared following the repression.

On January 28, 1993, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali delivered the report S/25170, where three possibilities were proposed to improve the peace plan:

1) to intensify the dialogue among the parts so that to arrive to an accord on the way to organize the referendum;

2) to celebrate the referendum the first possible substantially modifying the electoral body;

3) to abandon the actual plan of peace and look for an alternative solution.

On March 2, 1993, the resolution 809 of the UN Security Council welcomed the first proposal contained in the relationship of the Secretary-General, it confirmed the preceding resolutions and expressed strong worry for the persistent divergences among the two parts. Confirming that the 1974 Spanish census is the base to establish the eligibles to the vote it didn't admit the criteria of amplification pretended from Morocco; the Special Representative was entrusted of to swiftly proceed to the application of the resolutions.

In those months, reports from US Department of State, the European Parliament and Amnesty International expressed worry for the lack of respect of human rights in Morocco. On May 31st, 1993, Boutros-Ghali visited the region. Followed legislative elections in Morocco, extended also to the occupied Western Sahara.

On July 16, 1993, there was a meeting in Laâyoune among delegations of Frente Polisario and Morocco, publicized by Rabat as a meeting between monarchy-faithful Saharawis and dissident Saharawi, with no discussion about the Moroccanity of the Sahara. In the report S/26185, Boutros-Ghali expressed satisfaction for the meeting of Laâyoune, also admitting fundamental divergences among Polisario and Morocco. On October 25th, a following meeting in New York among the Polisario and Morocco failed. Rabat, at the last moment, changed the composition of the delegation inserting dissidents from the Polisario and excluding representatives of its own government. For Morocco the problem of the Western Sahara existed only for the Saharawis that had to find, among them, a pacific solution in the frame of the Moroccan community. This attitude was harshly criticized by the members of the UN Security Council; particularly the representative of the United States defined the behaviour of Morocco "provocative and unacceptable" affirming that "the patience of USA is at the limit."

On March 10, 1994, Boutros-Ghali delivered the report S/1994/283 (not available in the UN database but quoted in successive reports), making the point on the work of the Committee of Identification and proposing three options to go out of difficulties:

to) to organize the referendum at the end of 1994 without the collaboration of one of the two parts and following the attached calendar;

b) to continue the job of the Committee of identification on the base of the criteria established by the Secretary-General and to try, in the meantime, to get the cooperation of the two parts, with the intention to hold the referendum
by the end of 1994

c) to progressively put an end to the operation of the MINURSO, to suspend the process of identification and to maintain a shortened military presence in the territory only to preserve the cease-fire.

The Resolution 907 of the UN Security Council opted for the solution b) asking the Identification Commission to complete the analysis of all applications received and proceed with the identification and registration of potential voters by 30 June 1994, with a view to holding the referendum by the end of 1994.

On July 12, 1994, Boutros-Ghali delivered the report S/1994/819 according to which around 76.000 potential electors were enrolled in the lists. The identification of these electors was not begun for the difficulties risen with the designation of the observatories of the OAU, undesirable to Morocco.
Boutros-Ghali proposed a new calendar:
- August 31, limit to receive the applications for registration;
- within December 15, partial withdrawal of the Moroccan army and end of the work of identification;
- within January 25th, 1995, date of the referendum and term for the repatriation of all the electors;
- February 14th, 1995, date of the referendum;
- March 1995, end of the role of the MINURSO.

On May 26, 1995, the political stalemate brought the UN Security Council to approve the resolution 995 (1995) and send a mission to Western Sahara, from 3 to 9 June.
The mission report S/1995/498 of 21 June 1995 can be read on UN website.

The terms of reference of the mission, as set out by the Security Council (S/1995/431), were as follows:
(a) To impress upon the parties the necessity of cooperating fully with MINURSO in the implementation of all aspects of the settlement plan and to underline the fact that any further delay would put the whole operation at risk;
(b) To assess progress and identify problems in the identification process, bearing in mind the deadline for the referendum of January 1996;
(c) To identify problems in other areas relevant to the fulfillment of the settlement plan (including the reduction of Moroccan troops, the confinement of troops of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (the Frente POLISARIO), the release of political prisoners and detainees, the exchange of prisoners of war and the return of refugees).
The mission left New York on 3 June and visited Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania where it held meetings with senior government officials of those countries, including an audience with Mr. Maaoya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya, President of Mauritania. In addition, the mission visited Tindouf, where it met with the leadership of the Frente POLISARIO. In Tindouf, the mission also held a briefing session with officials of MINURSO and some of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) observers currently there and witnessed the identification operation in two centres. The mission then went to Laayoune, where it attended a meeting with local Moroccan government officials, was briefed by the MINURSO Force Commander and Civilian Police Commissioner and met with the remaining OAU observers and some MINURSO staff. While in Laayoune, the mission also witnessed the identification operation.
The Mininster of Interior of Morocco, Driss Basri, pointed out that that the 100,000 applicants currently not residing in the Territory would have to be identified, because, according to Mr. Basri, the Spanish census did not take into account the structure of the Saharan society, hence Morocco’s position that additional criteria were needed for the identification of potential voters.
Instead, in the Frente POLISARIO’S view, the list of voters should be based on the 1974 census, with a small margin of increase to allow for population growth. The mission was said that the Frente POLISARIO had expressed serious reservations about the implementation of criteria 4 and 5 and about the admission of oral testimony by the sheikhs.

In May 1996, as the situation (lack of transparency, trust and goodwill) didn’t change, the UN suspended the identification process blaming both sides for problems and recalled most MINURSO civilian staff. Military personnel stayed to oversee the cease-fire.

In 1997, after years of stalemate, the deadlock was broken thanks to the appointments taken by the new UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his new envoy to Western Sahara, James Baker III, former US Secretary of State.
After three rounds of talks were hold in London and Lisbon, on September 14-16, 1997, three days of talks at the Baker Institute in Houston resulted in the so-called Houston Agreement, a significant step forward, with agreement reached for the first time on a proposed code of conduct for the Referendum on the Western Sahara, guidelines for the role of the United Nations during the transition period, and the principles that will govern the process of identifying voters who can participate in the referendum. The negotiations included high-level delegations from the United Nations, Morocco, and the Polisario, with additional delegates from Algeria and Mauritania serving as observers.
After the talks, the Secretary-General updated the UN Security Council through the Report S/1997/742.
But later the referendum, set for December 7, 1998, was suspended after further disagreements.

After the arrival of Mohammed VI of Morocco to the throne, in July 1999, Morocco had reneged on its 1991 and 1997 agreements on a vote on independence. Polisario argued that Morocco had thus broken a main condition of the 1991 cease-fire agreement, which had wholly hinged on the independence referendum.
In December 1999, the lists of the eligibles to the vote were published with 86,425 applicants eligible. The identification process was finished but MINURSO had to face 131,038 appeals to be analyzed.
Polisario asked to fix a date for the referendum menacing to return to the armed struggle.

In 2000, negotiations between Polisario and Morocco failed in London and Berlin. Agreements were reached only on the release of Prisoners Of War (POWs, 1,800 Moroccans according to ICRC 1998 report), a code of conduct for a referendum campaign and UN authority during a transition period. Further talks in Geneva broke down. In the words of Kofi Annan (S/2002/178, paragraph 30), "neither party had shown any disposition (...) to discuss any possible political solution in which each could get some, but not all, of what it wanted and would allow the other side to do the same".
In few words (S/2002/178, paragraph 35) Polisario was not ready to discuss anything outside the settlement plan, which included the self-determination referendum with independence option. In the meanwhile, Morocco wanted to work out a lasting and definitive solution, in a frank and sincere dialogue with the Polisario, taking account of Morocco's sovereignty and territorial integrity (no independence option).
The negotiations on the future of Western Sahara had turned to the Baker Plan (formal name, Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara) which was intended to substitute the Settlement Plan of 1991.
The first version of the plan (Baker I or the Framework Agreement) was delivered by UN special envoy James Baker in May 2000. It was meant to give the people of Western Sahara self-determination through a large autonomy within the Moroccan state. Except for defense and foreign policy, all other capacities would be in the responsibility of a local government. Morocco accepted the plan while Algeria and the Polisario front rejected it. Algeria even countered by proposing that the territory be divided between the parties, resisted by Morocco.

In May 2001, Morocco presented to the United Nations a new proposal, commonly known as "third option" on Western Sahara; the Moroccan project provided a «substantial devolution of authority» to local people with final status to be determined by a referendum five years later. Polisario agreed to enter autonomy as a third option on the referendum ballot, but refused to discuss any referendum that did not allow for the possibility of independence, arguing that such a referendum could not constitute self-determination in the legal sense of the term.

On June 20th, 2001, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan presented his report S/2001/613. He proposed UN to abandon the 1991 settlement plan by offering instead a "framework agreement" following the "Baker I" plan.
UN Security Council approved a resolution extending the mandate of the UN Mission in Western Sahara by five months, until the end of November 2001.

In July 2001 the OAU ministerial session firmly rejected a request from the Senegalese foreign affairs minister backed by his counterparts from Gambia, Gabon, Burkina Faso, to register on the agenda of the OAU summit of Lusaka the question of Morocco admission to the African Union.

At the end of August 2001, James Baker III, met in Wyoming with representatives of the Polisario and the Governments of Algeria and Mauritania in Pinedale, Wyoming. Baker considered that the only way to put an end to the stalemate was through a negotiated solution based on an autonomy within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty. Baker proposed to drop the referendum for the time being and let Morocco guaranteed sovereignty over the territory for four years, including Moroccan control of internal security and the judicial system. In exchange, the Saharawis were offered some leeway in controlling their own economic and social affairs, some regional autonomy prior to moving towards an unspecified political settlement at some point in the future.
Morocco, which had given its approval to this project as a base for further negotiations, was not asked to attend this round of talks.
The Polisario rejected categorically the project of "outline agreement", and reaffirmed its attachment to the "UN Settlement Plan", which both sides, Morocco and Polisario, had already agreed upon. Polisario warned that if the referendum option would be not restored, it may revert to war.

In 2001 Morocco divided offshore oil exploration rights on the Western Saharan coast between a US and a French oil company. On December 2, French President Jacques Chirac of France described the Western Sahara as Morocco's Southern Provinces. If in the 1990s the Moroccans paid lip service to international law and the principle of self-determination, in this moment they overtly scorned it, buoyed by the knowledge that France will always back them to the hilt and the US are unlikely to alienate one of their few close Muslim allies.
Tension mounted in the region as the referendum had been delayed 12 times.

On January 2, 2002, the Polisario released 115 of the 1,477 Moroccan POWs hold in Tindouf. They were repatriated under the auspices of the International Committee of Red Cross. Despite the political stalemate, both sides showed the only willingness to implement the UN-baked Settlement plan.
On February 19, 2002, Kofi Annan presented the report S/2002/178 to the Security Council with four options to break the impasse in the Sahara:

implementation of the settlement plan without requiring the concurrence of both parties;
revise the framework agreement taking into account the concerns expressed by the parties, but without requiring the concurrence of both parties;
explore with the parties one final time a possible division of the territory;
terminate MINURSO without any result after 11 years and 500,000$ of expenditures.

In 2002 the UN Legal Department declared Western Sahara as a Non Self-Governing country awaiting decolonisation. Neither UN nor OAU considered Morocco the legal administering power in the territory.

The president of the Spanish Government, Jose Maria Aznar, affirmed that there are no reasons to change Spain's traditional position on Western Sahara, that maintains its support to the effective implementation of the UN settlement plan, which calls for a self-determination referendum. So the Moroccan army briefly occupied the small and uninhabited Isla Perejil, but left without fighting shortly afterwards, when Spain sent in soldiers.

In May SADR and the Democratic Republic of East Timor established diplomatic relations.

On May 27th, 2002, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) announced that it has signed a Technical Cooperation Agreement (TCA) with the British-Australian exploration company, Fusion Oil & Gas plc, that will lead to a detailed assessment of the oil and gas potential of the offshore territorial waters of the state. So, oil exploration were being conducted in earnest both on and offshore, with rival transnational companies seeking rights from Morocco (Kerr-McGee) and Western Sahara (Fusion and Premier).

In July 2002 the Security Council voted to extend the mandate of MINURSO.

On November 6th, 2002, in his first public dismissal of the UN Settlement Plan for Western Sahara, Morocco's King said it is "obsolete" and "inapplicable". Speaking on the 27th anniversary of the green march, supported by France, Mohamed VI said the territory could be granted autonomy but should be part of Morocco.

In January 2003, the second version of the Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara (Baker II) was delivered. The UN Security Council accepted the plan in July 2003 (Resolution 1495), supporting it "as an optimum political solution" and extended the mandate of MINURSO till October 2003.
The plan aimed at instituting a semi-autonomous Saharan self-rule by a "Western Sahara Authority" for a period of five years, after which the referendum had to be held, with all the population of Western Sahara allowed to vote, included the 200.000 or so Moroccan settlers who have been enticed to the territory by subsidies and relocation deals.
In a surprise move, the Polisario accepted the document as a basis of negotiations; Morocco stalled for several months, but eventually rejected the plan, stating that the kingdom will no longer accept independence as one of the ballot options.

In the same Resolution 1495 (comma 4) the UN called upon the Polisario to release without further delay all remaining POWs in compliance with international humanitarian law.

In January 2004 MINURSO's mandate was extended until April and then for another year. But the peace process was deadlocked, so that the envoy James Baker III, frustrated over the lack of progress in reaching a complete settlement acceptable to both the parties, resigned from his position in June 2004, Peruvian Alvaro de Soto took his place.

On March 13, 2004, the leaders of eleven political parties expressed unanimously "their dismissal of all manoeuvres of the enemies of the territorial unity that persists in their vain attempts aiming to undermine the territorial integrity of the Kingdom"
(Official Moroccan Agency MAP, March 9, 2004 - http://www.arso.org/docu/actef.htm).
While the Kingdom was in prey to a troubling rise of Islamism and to economic problems, the Moroccanity of the Western Sahara was a key component of the identity of the country, able to federate it on this point at least.
It was calculated that around 250.000 Moroccans lived in the occupied territories among farmers, soldiers, police officers and administrative personnel. Some say up to 300.000 among which 120.000 soldiers.

The SADR Government could never operate from Laâyoune, but from a small patch of desert over the border in Algeria where over 160.000 Sahrawi refugees, who have lived in refugee exile for almost three decades, always dependent on UN food aid, named their own ‘temporary’ settlements after the major cities of their homeland: Laâyoune, Smara, Aoserd and Dakhla. The real Laâyoune, once the capital of Spanish Sahara, remained a dusty, modest place with no notable architectural features, despite significant investment by the occupying Moroccans over the past 30 years.

At that time 404 Moroccan POWs were still held by the Polisario. Some had been in captivity for more than 20 years. In the meanwhile something like 70,000 Saharawis were living in the Territory under Moroccan rule.

On April 29th, 2005, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to extend the mandate of MINURSO through October 31. Personnel comprised then ca. 500 people, including local staff. At the same time Reporters sans frontiéres denounced the impossibility for journalists to make reports about Western Sahara, because of Moroccan repression.

At this point, prospects for the Saharawis looked bleak. But in September 2004 South Africa announced that it was formally recognizing the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, affirming that its decision was in line with "the principles and objectives enshrined in the African Union and United Nations Charters". President of South Africa Thabo Mbeki’s letter to the UN explaining the decision made it clear he believed Morocco was no longer to be trusted on this issue.
Morocco promptly withdrew its ambassador from Pretoria.

Since early 2005, the UN Secretary General stopped referring to the Baker Plan in his reports, considering it largely dead. No replacement plan was made, which could result in renewed fighting.
In May 25, 2005, an uprising began in the cities of El Aaiun and Smara, and student uprisings occurred in Moroccan universities, repressed by police intervention resulting in an unspecified number of arrests.
Then a number of detainees in the custody of the Moroccan authorities went on a hunger strike from early August to 29 September.

In July 2005, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed Peter van Walsum of the Netherlands as his Personal Envoy for Western Sahara.

On August 17, 2005, Polisario announced the release of all all remaining 404 Moroccan POWs, who were repatriated to Morocco by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

In June 2005, Kenya gave full recognition to the SADR, followed by Uruguay in December. On the other side, the same month, Sudan started to openly support Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara.
At that time, the international recognition of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic was as follows:

45 states recognized the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic
12 of these 45 were home to Saharawi embassies
13 had "frozen" relations
22 had cancelled recognition

***Note: this list is based on several sources and it may be incomplete.

UN Security Council Resolution 1634 (2005) followed the report of the UN Secretary-General of 13 October 2005 (S/2005/648). It only reaffirmed the UN "commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara."

Kofi Annan said in his report S/2005/648:
"The lack of progress was compounded by the overall tense political climate in the region. In addition to harsh public statements emanating periodically from the parties, demonstrations and allegations of human rights abuses in the Territory suggest that the situation could deteriorate further in the absence of a mutually acceptable solution that would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. I remain committed to helping the parties to reach such a solution, but it is up to them to take strategic decisions that would define, inter aha, the role that the United Nations could play to assist them in overcoming their differences. I urge them, after years of stalemate, to demonstrate the necessary flexibility and to cooperate in good faith with my new Personal Envoy."

From October 2005 to February 2006 Peter van Walsum consulted Polisario Algeria, Morocco and other countries. On April 19, 2006, the report S/2006/249 was delivered, containing no steps onward.

From the report S/2006/249:
"On 6 November 2005, a ceremony was held in Laayoune to mark the thirtieth anniversary of Morocco’s “Green March” into Western Sahara. From 24 to 28 February 2006, the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente Polisario) held celebrations to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the “Saharan Arab Democratic Republic” in Tindouf, Algeria, and Tifariti, Western Sahara, about 70 kilometres east of the berm. On 20 March 2006, King Mohammed VI arrived in Laayoune for a five-day visit to Western Sahara. He announced the appointment of a new President and other high-level officials to the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS), in an effort to revive the body (CORCAS was originally devised by King Hassan II in the 1970s, but allowed to expire, and renewed by his son, King Mohammed VI in early 2006), which comprises traditional leaders (sheikhs), civil society representatives and elected members.
During the period under review, several demonstrations calling for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara and respect for their human rights were organized in Laayoune and other main towns in the Territory. The demonstrations led to violent confrontations between the participants and the Moroccan security forces, resulting in arrests and detentions. Tensions were particularly acute in late October, following the death of a young Saharan demonstrator as a result of injuries incurred during a protest held in Laayoune on 29 October 2005. Moroccan authorities subsequently ordered the arrest and detention of two police officers involved in the incident, pending the completion of a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of the demonstrator’s death. In response to the demonstrations, the presence of Moroccan security and police forces increased in all the main towns in Western Sahara, and in December, army troops were deployed in the Territory, for the first time since 1999. In letters addressed to me on 17 November 2005, 14 and 20 December 2005 respectively, the Secretary General 2 S/2006/249 of the Frente Polisario, Mohamed Abdelaziz, called upon the United Nations to intervene to protect the Saharan citizens and guarantee their human rights, condemned the intervention of the Moroccan police and military in the demonstrations and warned that the deployment of Moroccan military officers to Western Sahara constituted a dangerous development that could lead to additional incidents, including “deadly confrontations” between Moroccan and Saharan civilians.
On 25 March 2006, the King of Morocco granted pardons to 216 prisoners, including 30 Saharan activists. Pro-Saharan demonstrations were organized in Laayoune, Boujdour, Dakhla and Smara to welcome the release of the Saharan activists and demand the release of 37 more Saharan political prisoners. According to various media reports, Moroccan security forces intervened to disperse the demonstrators, leading to a number of arrests."

On March 25, 2006, in the founding speech of the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS), King Mohammed VI clearly affirmed the impossibility to go on with UN peace plan; instead he proposed autonomy for Morocco's Southern Provinces (Western Sahara), pointing out that Morocco will never give up even not a grain of sand of its territory.

On 26 July, 2006, the European Union signed a fisheries agreement with the Government of Morocco whereby fishing vessels from countries in the Union would gain access to the territorial waters off Morocco.

On 29 July 2006, seventh anniversary of his accession to the throne, King Mohammed VI of Morocco gave a speech in which he proposed a plan for the autonomy of Western Sahara giving to CORCAS the charge to submit a plan. Then he made visits to a number of countries to explain the proposal.
The Spanish approach to regional autonomy was named as a possible model for Western Saharan autonomy, mentioning specifically the cases of the Canary Islands, the Basque Country, Andalusia or Catalonia.

STATUS OF THE DISPUTE AT PRESENT DAY
The Western Sahara conflict is both one of the world’s oldest and one of its most neglected. More than 30 years after the war began, the displacement of large numbers of UN peacekeepers and a ceasefire in 1991, its end remains remote. Analyzing the long peace process in its entirety, somebody affirmed that the United Nations were unable to stick to its own legality, shifting its ground at every juncture with untoward partiality, cloaked in the usual language of compromise. UN were also accused to work not on very public dossiers, but all the more in semi-secretive ones. (http://www.gees.org/articulo/1314)
Then, in October 2006, former Korean Minister Ban Ki-moon was appointed new Secretary-General of the UN.

As in the UN Secretary-General's Report S/2007/202 of April 13, 2007, both Morocco and Polisario presented officially separated proposals.
On April 10, Ban Ki-moon had received the “Proposal of the Frente Polisario for a mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara”. The proposal reaffirmed the right for a self-determination referendum including the independence option, recalling that the conflict is about decolonization.
On April 11, Ban Ki-moon had received the “Moroccan initiative for negotiating an autonomy statute for the Sahara region”. The initiative proposed to Saharawis an autonomy through legislative, executive and judicial bodies enjoying exclusive powers. Morocco would keep the royal domains, especially with respect to defense, external relations and the constitutional and religious prerogatives of His Majesty the King.

Moroccan initiative received the backing of the USA and France. In a letter to president Bush, 173 members of US congress endorsed the plan.
This initiative constituted the main ground for the Moroccan proposal at Manhasset negotiations, a series of direct talks resulted from the UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1754 of April 30, 2007, which called "upon the parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions in good faith, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara".
The resolution also extended MINURSO's mandate until October 31, 2007.

On June 18-19, 2007, discussions started at Manhasset, New York, between the Moroccan government and the representatives of the Polisario, involving the neighbouring countries, Algeria and Mauritania. The parties held separate meetings with Peter van Walsum, as well as two sessions of face-to-face discussions, for the first time since direct talks had been held in London and Berlin in 2000.
During the first round of talks (Manhasset I) both parties agreed to resume talks on August 10-11. The second round (Manhasset II) ended with no breakthroughs but parties agreed again to meet for another round tough no date has been fixed yet.

On December 14-16, 2007, the 12th Congress of SADR was held in the isolated Polisario-controlled outpost of Tifariti. More than 1,500 delegates discussed if resuming armed struggle, pursuing negotiations or starting preparations for the resumption of war while pursuing negotiations at the same time. Moroccan government officials addressed the gathering at Tifariti as illegal, urging the UN to prevent it from taking place.

Polisario's general secretary, Mohamed Abdelaziz, stated at the congress that he does not want a military solution. However, he warned that if Polisario were to be forced to resume the armed struggle, it would bring with it a fierce war of incalculable consequences for the stability of the entire region. As international delegates and the media left the congress after two days, intense discussions among the Polisario representatives prolonged the congress an additional 48 hours. According to Polisario spokesperson Mhamed Khadad, the result was a decision to meet again in six months, when a final decision on taking arms will be determined.

On January 7-9, 2008, a third round of peace talks (Manhasset III) was held in Manhasset, just outside New York City. UN mediator Peter van Valsum said the parties continued to be far apart on the question of independence. Morocco maintained that its sovereignty over Western Sahara should be recognized and affirmed that independence cannot work as ethnic Sahrawis live in four different countries and a referendum is impossible to stage. The Polisario's position was that the Territory's final status should be decided in a referendum including independence as an option.

HUMAN RIGHTS (from UN Secretary-General's Report S/2007/202 of April 13, 2007 - paragraphs 39/40)
During the period under review, demonstrations by Saharans calling for respect for human rights and the right to self-determination are reported to have continued in the Territory. On 11 December 2006, Secretary General Abdelaziz wrote to my predecessor, Secretary-General Annan, to protest the “brutal repression” and arrest of demonstrators by Moroccan security forces during protests to mark International Human Rights Day. Subsequently, on 3 and 21 February 2007, respectively, I received letters from Mr. Abdelaziz, protesting the “brutal intervention” by Moroccan forces following demonstrations in Laayoune, and calling for the immediate release of 38 Saharan prisoners, who had been on a hunger strike in Laayoune’s “Carcel Negra” prison since 30 January, in protest of their conditions of detention. On 3 March, the prisoners reportedly suspended their hunger strike. On 2 April, Mr. Abdelaziz wrote to me again with regard to his continuing concerns about alleged human rights abuses in the Territory. On 9 April, I received a letter from the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations, expressing concern about increasing alleged human rights violations in the Saharan refugee camps near Tindouf, in Algeria. He also referred to allegations by international non-governmental organizations of a deterioration of the human rights situation in the camps.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has continued to follow the human rights situation in Western Sahara and the Tindouf camps and remains committed to ensure that the rights of the people of Western Sahara are fully protected. OHCHR continued to receive information alleging that human rights defenders’ trials were falling short of international fair trial standards. Allegations received from several sources also related to incidents where the rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly appear to have been compromised.

ASSISTANCE TO WESTERN SAHARA REFUGEES (from UN Secretary-General's Report S/2007/202 of April 13, 2007 - paragraphs 29/32)
The assistance programme to the Saharan refugees, including food distribution, continues to support those deemed most vulnerable in the Tindouf refugee camps in Algeria.

With funding from the European Commission, the primary school infrastructure that was heavily damaged by the floods in February 2006 was reconstructed under the auspices of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The water distribution system, hitherto supplied by tankers in most camps, is being gradually replaced by more efficient and safe, piped water systems. Hygiene will thereby be improved and the risk of infectious diseases reduced. During the reporting period, a second stage of the safer water supply system was under construction. A third stage will be implemented in 2007 and a master plan for safe water adduction will be designed during the year.

In January 2007, UNHCR and the World Food Programme (WFP) sent a joint assessment mission to Tindouf to verify the food requirements of the Saharan refugees for the coming two years. The mission recommended that the refugees should continue to receive emergency food assistance. Pending a registration of refugees, the caseload would be established at 90,000 beneficiaries. In line with the recommendation of the mission, 35,000 supplementary rations would also be distributed to women of child-bearing age, malnourished children under 5 years and schoolchildren, in order to address serious problems of chronic malnutrition and anaemia among these particularly vulnerable sectors of the camps´ population.

The food pipeline has been very fragile since September 2006, when the food security stock in Rabouni, Algeria, was liquidated and not replaced, due to lack of funding. Over 8,000 metric tonnes of food commodities for the refugee camps are required for the coming six months, but funding has not yet been pledged. I call upon donors to contribute generously to the Saharan refugee assistance programme, including the feeding operation, in order to make the living conditions of the refugees tolerable and to prevent further interruptions in their food distribution.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF MINURSO (from UN Secretary-General's Report S/2007/202 of April 13, 2007 - paragraphs 45/46)
The General Assembly, by its resolution 60/280, appropriated the amount of $44.5 million gross for the maintenance of MINURSO for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007. Therefore, should the Security Council approve my recommendation set out in paragraph 53 below as to the extension of the mandate of MINURSO, the cost for the operation and maintenance of the Mission during the extension period will be limited to the resources approved by the Assembly.

As at 31 December 2006, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for MINURSO amounted to $52.1 million. As a result of the outstanding assessed contributions, the Organization has not been in a position to reimburse the Governments providing troops for the troop costs incurred since April 2002. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at 31 December 2006 amounted to $1,889.6 million.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY (figures include together Morocco and Western Sahara)
According to the African Development Bank, the GDP of Morocco accounts for 7% of the African continent. Morocco is the fifth economic power of Africa with a 2006 GDP of $152.5 billion at PPP ($58.1 billion at official exchange rates), after South Africa, Egypt, Algeria and Nigeria (2001 est.).

Morocco's largest industry is the mining of phosphates. Its second largest source of income is from nationals living abroad who transfer money to relatives living in Morocco. The country's third largest source of revenue is tourism.

Morocco ranks among the world’s largest producers and exporters of cannabis, and its cultivation and sale provide the economic base for much of the population of northern Morocco. The cannabis is typically processed into hashish. This activity represents about 0.5% of Morocco's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). A UN survey estimated cannabis cultivation at about 1,340 square kilometres in Morocco's five northern provinces. This represents 10 % of the total area and 27 per cent of the arable lands of the surveyed territory and 1.5 per cent of Morocco's total arable land.

Morocco has signed Free Trade Agreements with the European Union (to take effect 2010) and the United States of America. The United States Senate approved by a vote of 85 to 13, on July 22, 2004, the US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, which will allow for 98% of the two-way trade of consumer and industrial products to be without tariffs. The agreement entered into force in January 2006.

MOROCCO-RELATED INFORMATION WEBSITES
Western Sahara Online
Sahara Marocain.net
CORCAS

POLISARIO-RELATED INFORMATION WEBSITES
Western Sahara
Sahara Press Service
ARSO